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Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War, India’s strategic horizons have moved beyond its traditional 
preoccupations in South Asia.  India is developing a strategic role in East Asia in particular.  
At the same time India's strategic thinking has undergone a revolution, as the country that 
prided itself on non-alignment has moved closer to the West.  But India’s culture, history and 
geography still fundamentally shape its worldview.  In engaging with East Asia, India is 
guided by a mosaic of strategic objectives about extending its sphere of influence, 
developing a multipolar regional system and balancing against China.  The interplay of these 
objectives will frame India’s role in East Asia in coming years. 
 
Keywords 




This article examines some of the key themes in strategic thinking that underlie and inform 
India’s strategic engagement in East Asia.    
 
Many believe that in the coming years India will assume an important role in the security of 
East Asia.  There has been much discussion about India’s Look East Policy and its growing 
engagement with East Asia, but there has been little consideration of Indian strategic 
thinking about the region.   While India’s engagement with East Asia is motivated in part by 
rivalry with China, Indian strategic thinking also remains very much a function of India’s 
culture, history and geographic position.      
 
This article will first provide an overview of India’s strategic engagement with East Asia in 
recent years.  Second, it will examine India’s legacy of Nehruvian strategic doctrine and 
recent developments in strategic thinking.  Third, it will examine India’s long term quest for 
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strategic autonomy and a multipolar regional order.  Fourth, it will review Indian thinking 
about an Asian balance of power.  Fifth it will reflect on ideological considerations in India’s 
international relations.  It will then consider India’s maritime ambitions and ideas about an 
expanded sphere of influence for India that reaches into East Asia.      
 
1. India’s engagement with East Asia 
 
This section will provide an overview of India’s engagement with East Asia over the last two 
decades.1  
 
The end of the Cold War was a major political, economic and strategic turning point for 
India.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union India lost its strategic guarantor against China 
and its role as a leader of the non-aligned world.   Almost simultaneously, India was plunged 
into its worst economic and political crises since Independence.   These developments led to 
a fundamental reassessment of India’s international relations.  In 1992, India announced its 
“Look East Policy,” which was initially focussed on expanding trade and investment ties with 
East Asia.   India quickly developed good multilateral political links with the region, 
becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1995, joining the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996 
and holding annual bilateral summits with ASEAN from 2002.   With the support of the 
majority of ASEAN states, India joined the first East Asian Summit in 2005 and is now widely 
regarded as a likely member of any future Asian economic community.    
 
Since the turn of the century, India has given greater emphasis to broader strategic 
objectives in the region.  As Prime Minister Singh commented in 2005, the Look East policy 
is not merely an external economic policy, “but a strategic shift in India’s vision.”2   India has 
successfully developed a close partnership with Singapore as its economic, political and 
1 For discussions on India’s strategic engagement with East Asia, see N.S.Sisodia and Sreeradha 
Datta, Changing Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Magnum Books, 2008); and David 
Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power (London: Routledge, 2011).    
2 Manmohan Singh, “Address at the 16th Asian Corporate Conference,” Mumbai, 18 March 2006. 
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security gateway to Southeast Asia.3  It has (with somewhat less success) attempted to 
transform its long term political alliance with Vietnam into a more broad-based security and 
economic relationship4  and is also developing closer relations with Indonesia, particularly in 
the sphere of maritime security cooperation.  India has also made considerable progress in 
developing a strategic relationship with Japan, including ongoing broad-based security 
consultation and joint naval exercises, which was crowned by a joint Security Declaration in 
October 2008.5  
 
India’s engagement with East Asia has occurred in the context of long term strategic 
competition with China.  This is fed by their unresolved territorial dispute in the Himalayas, 
China’s relationships with India’s South Asian neighbours and India’s fears of growing 
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.   While both India and 
China have generally been careful to keep such rivalry within bounds, many consider that 
strategic competition between them is likely to grow as India reaches for major power 
status.6  India’s engagement with East Asia has been complemented by its developing 
security relationship with the United States.  After years of steady improvements in political, 
economic and security relations, in July 2007 the two concluded negotiations on a nuclear 
cooperation agreement, which signaled a significant expansion of military and security 
relationships between them in the coming years.7 
 
3  See Asad-Ul Iqbal Latif, Between Rising Powers: China, Singapore and India, (Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 2006). 
4 David Brewster, “The strategic relationship between India and Vietnam:  The search for a diamond 
on the South China Sea?” Asian Security, 5/1  (January 2009), 24 – 44. 
5 See David Brewster, “The India – Japan Security Declaration:  an enduring security partnership?” 
Asian Security, 6/2 (2010), 1-27. 
6 See generally, Francine R.Frankel and Harry Harding (eds.), The India-China Relationship: Rivalry 
and Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
7For a discussion of the various dimensions of US-Indian strategic cooperation, see Sumit Ganguly, 
Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (eds), US-Indian strategic cooperation into the 21st century: more 
than words (London: Routledge, 2006). 
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Although India has had a significant degree of success in developing strategic relationships 
in East Asia, there remain important questions about India’s objectives, particularly in the 
security dimension.  Is India primarily driven by strategic rivalry with China? To what extent 
will India be drawn into the US alliance system in East Asia?  Does India aim to become a 
major power in East Asia?    
          
2. The post-Cold War revolution in Indian strategic thinking  
 
India’s engagement with East Asia has been accompanied by a revolution in Indian strategic 
thinking.   Through much of the Cold War, Nehruvian strategic doctrine formed the 
intellectual foundation of Indian strategic analysis.  At its core was the concept of 
nonalignment, which brought together several long-running strands of Indian strategic 
thought.  As Nehru claimed, “I have not originated non-alignment: it is a policy inherent in 
the circumstances of India.”8  The key principles of nonalignment were nonviolence, 
international cooperation and the preservation of India's international freedom of action 
through refusing to align India with any Cold War bloc.9  V.K. Krishna Menon characterised it 
as “the policy of independence” in which India took its decisions in her own national 
interests, in contrast with aligned states where decisions were placed “in foreign hands.”10  
Nonalignment was given international effect through the Non-Alignment Movement which 
provided India with the status of a de facto leader of the third world.11   Although Indian 
strategic practice was progressively modified towards a more realist stance following India’s 
defeat at the hands of China in 1962 and its strategic alignment with the Soviet Union in 
8 Rikhi Jaipal, Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace (New Delhi: Allied 
Publishers, 1983), 8. 
9 Among the plethora of studies on nonalignment and Nehruvian strategic doctrine, see 
Mannaraswamighala Sreeranga Rajan, Studies on nonalignment and the nonaligned movement: 
theory and practice (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1986); and K. Subrahmanyam, Indian security 
perspectives (New Delhi: ABC, 1982). 
10 Quoted in Sita Gopalan, India and Non-Alignment (New Delhi: Spick & Span, 1984), 2. 
11 For a study of the Non Aligned Movement, see Jaipal, Non-Alignment. 
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1971, Nehruvian strategic principles remained an intellectual anchor to Indian strategic 
thinking and dominated Indian strategic rhetoric up until the end of the Cold War.12   
  
Nehruvian strategic doctrine inhibited India from playing a significant role in the security of 
East Asia until recently.   Throughout much of the Cold War India saw its interests in East 
Asia as largely limited to rhetorical efforts to minimise the influence of other major powers.   
India abdicated any leadership role that it could have had in Southeast Asia and only really 
sought to exert its influence in negative terms, such as its emphatic rejection of regional 
security relationships with the United States.13   Nehruvian strategic doctrine also 
contributed to a virtual absence of any strategic relationships between India and maritime 
Northeast Asia.  Throughout most of the Cold War, Indian leaders viewed Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan as little more than protectorates of the United States and therefore of 
little interest to India except, in the case of Japan, as a potential source of capital and 
technology.    
 
The end of the Cold War forced India to re-examine the viability of the Nehruvian principles 
in guiding India’s strategic stance.   With the collapse of the Soviet Union the idea of 
nonalignment seemed to have lost its raison d’être.  India’s leaders were forced to fashion a 
new set of strategic goals based on a more pragmatic view of the world.  India’s strategic 
options included attempting to continue with the logic of nonalignment, joining the US 
alliance system or attempting to balance against the United States through joining with 
other second-tier powers.  Alternatively, it could pursue a multipolar world in which it 
would establish itself as one of the major powers in the international system without 
recourse to any alliance.  While the notion of a triangular security relationship among India, 
12 The extent to which in practice (if not in rhetoric) India progressively abandoned non-alignment in 
favour of realist policies after 1962 is still a matter of much debate.  See, for example, Rudra 
Chaudhuri, “Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 32/6 (December 2009), 841-869. 
13 For discussions of India’s political relations in Southeast Asia during the Cold War see  Mohammed 
Ayoob,  India and Southeast Asia : Indian perceptions and policies (New York: Routledge, 1990) and 
Kripa Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996). 
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Russia and China was debated within the Indian strategic community during the 1990s, 
there was a realisation that there was little to gain from seeking to create a countervailing 
bloc against the United States.  By the end of the 1990s, the dominant emphasis in Indian 
strategic thinking had settled on building a new partnership with the United States as part of 
a multidirectional engagement of the major powers.    
 
Many believe that India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998 became the fulcrum around which 
India’s post Cold War strategic thinking turned.   Before the tests, India’s ambiguous nuclear 
status created significant obstacles to improving relations with the United States and its 
allies.  Although the nuclear tests caused a storm of protest internationally, it led to a 
transformation of India’s relationship with the United States and also provided India with a 
new status in Asia.  According to Mohan, after Pokhran II India’s self-perception as an 
emerging great power armed with nuclear weapons allowed it to negotiate with other 
powers without the sense of defensiveness that had permeated earlier relationships.  India’s 
successful transition to a nuclear power also moved India’s intellectual balance in favour of 
realists and pragmatists and effectively ended the long-standing dominance of Nehruvians 
and left-of-centre internationalists over the foreign policy discourse.14  Nevertheless, many 
of the underlying themes of nonalignment (e.g. strategic autonomy) still strongly influence 
Indian thinking. 
 
There have been several attempts to characterise and define the various ideological schools 
in Indian strategic thinking as they have developed since the end of the Cold War.  Bajpai 
identifies three paradigms of Indian strategic thinking: Nehruvianism, neoliberalism and 
hyper-realism, each characterised by differing attitudes towards internal security, regional 
security and relations with great powers and each of which are broadly associated with 
differing political ideologies.15  Sagar proposes a categorisation between moralists (who 
uphold the Nehruvian tradition), Hindu nationalists (who advocate protecting national 
14 C.Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 27. 
15 Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Strategic Culture” in Michael R. Chambers, South Asia in 2020:  Future 
Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). 
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values through building strength), strategists (secularists who advocate developing strategic 
capabilities) and liberals (who emphasise attaining security through trade and 
interdependence).16    
 
These categorisations provide a useful context for understanding the main ideological 
streams of Indian strategic thinking. However, in considering India’s strategic perceptions of 
East Asia such categorisations can quickly become sterile.   Rather than attempting to 
identify a dominant or cohesive intellectual school of thought behind Indian strategic 
ambitions, it is in many ways more instructive to examine those ambitions in light of various 
underlying themes in Indian strategic thinking relevant to East Asia.   One might see Indian 
strategic thinking in terms of a “mosaic” of many different threads and contrasting themes 
and influences which often cross ideological boundaries.   This is partly a function of the 
immediate post-Cold War years, when Indian leadership allowed strategic policy to develop 
in a pragmatic way, generally avoiding a clear rejection of the past.  Having flirted 
disastrously with grand concepts in the past, India’s emphasis is on cautious realpolitik.17  
Tellis suggests that India does not have the luxury of pursuing policies that are “utterly 
transparent or completely straightforward” and instead must develop the institutional and 
psychological capacity to move deftly.18    However, ambiguity or a lack of transparency over 
India’s security objectives in East Asia has not prevented it from making significant steps 
towards engagement in the region. 
 
Key themes in Indian strategic thinking relevant to its engagement with East Asia include its 
objectives of strategic autonomy and a multipolar order; concepts of an Asian balance of 
power; the ideological dimension; the development of a maritime strategic outlook; and 
ideas about an Indian sphere of influence.  Each of these will be discussed in detail below. 
16 Rahul Sagar, “State of mind: what kind of power will India become,” International Affairs, 85/4 
(2009), 801-816. 
17 C.Raja Mohan, “India’s Changing Strategic Profile in East and Southeast Asia,” paper presented at 
the Regional Outlook Forum, Singapore, 8 January 2008, 12. 
18 Ashley J. Tellis, “India in Asian Geopolitics” in Prakash Nanda (ed.), Rising India: Friends and Foes, 
(New Delhi: Lancer, 2007) 129. 
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 3. India’s quest for strategic autonomy and a multipolar order 
 
Throughout its modern history India has sought what has been called the “Holy Grail” of 
Indian security policy:  strategic autonomy.19  Since independence and before many Indian 
leaders saw India’s destiny as a great power, beholden to no-one, even if it lacked the 
resources to assert itself in traditional ways. The combination of a destined greatness and 
material weakness was a key reason for India pursuing its nonaligned policy, allowing India 
to claim strategic space and assert itself as an international leader.   India’s destiny as a 
great power is now largely a given among Indian strategic thinkers and is virtually ubiquitous 
in strategic discussions; the only question being when the world will recognise India’s 
emergence.     
 
For many Indian strategists, strategic autonomy is the sine qua non of great power status.  
For some, particularly those strongly influenced by Nehruvian traditions, it is an absolute 
imperative: any compromise of India’s strategic autonomy will also compromise India’s 
destiny.  This not only forbids significant security cooperation with the United States and its 
regional allies but would also cast doubt on any security alignments outside the US alliance 
system.  An opposition to alliances was, of course, one of the core principles of non-
alignment (although this principle did not prevent India from entering into a strategic 
alignment or partnership with the Soviet Union in 1971 to address the perceived threats 
posed by China and Pakistan).   Others see the goal of strategic autonomy in less absolute or 
immediate terms, conceding that India’s interests may be served in entering into security 
relationships with the United States and others provided that India retains significant 
freedom of action.  Mohan for example argues that, “Alliance formation and balancing are 
tools in the kits of all great powers.”20    Closely related to India’s “destiny” as a great power 
and its quest for strategic autonomy is a desire for the development of a multipolar security 
order in the region and worldwide which, it is believed, is necessary to elevate India’s status 
19 Varun Sahni, “India and the Asian Security Architecture,” Current History, 105 (690) (April 2006), 
163-7. 
20 C.Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs, 85/ 4 (July/August 2006), 17. 
8 
 
                                                          
and maximise its freedom of action.   To some extent calls for a multipolar world have 
replaced nonalignment as a core concept of Indian foreign policy.    
 
India’s twin goals of strategic autonomy and multipolarity have a profound impact on India’s 
strategic engagement with East Asia.   In order to achieve a goal of regional multipolarity, 
India not only must cooperate with other major powers (particularly the United States and 
Japan) to balance against potential Chinese hegemony in East Asia, but arguably is also 
indirectly driven to establish a sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean region.   In pursuing 
those aims there are significant unresolved tensions between a desire for strategic 
autonomy and a perceived need to cooperate with the United States and its allies.    
 
4. Indian ideas on an Asian balance of power  
 
To what extent is the development of India’s strategic relationships in East Asia driven by a 
strategy of forming a balancing coalition against China?  India’s potential role in an East 
Asian balance of power is an important theme in Indian strategic thinking.  This might be 
expressed either in neorealist terms of creating a balancing coalition against China or in 
more classical realist terms of seeking to create a multipolar regional balance.  Mohan 
claims that balancing China is in “the very DNA of India’s geopolitics” and has been since the 
early 1950s.21 
 
However, Indian thinking about an Asian balance of power is complicated by several factors.   
As discussed, Indian strategic thinking is still in the process of evolving from Nehruvian 
traditions in which discussions of a “balance of power” were frowned upon.  Ideas of 
nonalignment still have resonance in Indian strategic debate, often with strong overtones of 
Indian exceptionalism.  Sahni, for example, sees India as playing a new nonaligned role in 
the developing Asian strategic order.  He believes that India is destined to be a fence-sitter 
in Asia, relatively equidistant and nonaligned between two poles of China and a US-led 
21 C.Raja Mohan, “The Evolution of Sino-Indian Relations: Implications for the United States,” in 
Alyssa Ayres and C.Raja Mohan, Power Realignments in Asia:  China, India and the United States, 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2009), 270-290, at 288. 
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coalition, although making significant efforts to cultivate friendships with powers such as 
Russia and Japan.22  In other words, India will again be able to transcend considerations of 
the balance of power, as Nehruvians claimed to have done during the Cold War.   
 
Mohan, an Indian “modernist,” believes that while it  has not entirely discarded a 
commitment to liberal internationalist notions over the last two decades, Indian political 
discourse has had to come to terms with realist concepts of the balance of power.23  
Certainly there is much more open discussion about an Asian balance of power than was the 
case during the Cold War.24   Although there is some official acknowledgement of what 
Defence Minister Mukherjee called India’s “crucial” role in maintaining a “stable balance of 
power”25 or an “equitable strategic balance”26 in Southeast Asia, at the same time there is 
considerable reluctance to acknowledge that any balancing might be aimed at China.  New 
Delhi is acutely conscious of its limitations in East Asia and is sensitive to any implication 
that its relationships in East Asia are driven by a desire to balance against China.27  India 
wishes to expand its strategic presence in the region while avoiding overt rivalry with China.        
 
There is also considerable sensitivity as to how an overt balancing strategy would affect 
India’s “Holy Grail” of strategic autonomy.  In particular, to what extent would India need to 
ally itself with the United States and its regional allies in order to create an East Asian 
balance against China?  Many see a significant risk that the United States will build India as a 
22 Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni, “India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, 
Normative Necessities,” South Asian Survey, 15/5 (2008), 5-32. 
23 C.Raja Mohan, “The Asian balance of power” Seminar, 487 (2000). 
24 See, for example, Anindya Batabyal, “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s Look 
East Strategy,” China Report (New Delhi), 42/2 (2006),79-197; and Bharat Karnad, “India’s Future 
Plans and Defence Requirements” in N.Sisodia and C.Udaya Bhaskar (eds), Emerging India: Security 
and Foreign Policy Perspectives (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2005), 61-76. 
25 Pranab Mukherjee, Address to the 5th IISS Asian Security Summit, 3 June 2006. 
26 Pranab Mukherjee, Address to the 7th Asian Security Conference, 29 January 2005. 
27 Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 211. 
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junior alliance partner to contain China and that India will be caught in a web of bilateral 
arrangements that meshes with the US “hub and spoke” alliance system.28   Thus there was 
considerable caution in parts of the Indian security community about the 2007 
“Quadrilateral” proposal for a security dialogue involving the United States, Japan, Australia 
and India on the grounds of being perceived to be part of a US-led security grouping.  
According to Tellis, even if an anti-China coalition led by the United States were to 
eventuate in the future, New Delhi’s intuitive preference would be to assert its strategic 
autonomy even more forcefully.  Short of the most extreme threats, India would prefer to 
deal with Beijing independently.29    
 
There is also a tendency among Indian strategic analysts of all stripes to see India as of 
significantly greater consequence to an East Asian balance of power than might be 
perceived in East Asia - where the focus is overwhelmingly on the United States, China and, 
to a lesser extent, Japan.   An internal report by the CIA’s National Intelligence Council which 
called India the most important “swing state” in the international system30 is quoted widely 
and approvingly among Indian leaders and commentators, recognising as it does an 
apparently powerful international role for India.31  In a similar vein, Mohan argues that 
28 Purnendra Jain, “From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan’s Changing View of India 
(1998-2007)”, Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper No.41, 10 March 2008; and Brahma 
Chellaney and Horimoto Takenori, ““Indo kara mita Nihon, Ajia“ [Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-
Pacific Security] Gaiko Forum, 7/2 (Fall 2007). 
29 Ashley J.Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia” in Zalmay Khalilzad et al, 
The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica: Rand 
Corporation, 2001) at 214. 
30 Non-public report, quoted in Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power:  An Action Agenda for the 
United States (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 2005).  
31  See, for example, Siddharth Varadarajan, “Bush, India and two degrees of separation,” The Hindu, 
3 March 2006; Amit Gupta, “US-India-China: Assessing Tripolarity,” China Report (New Delhi), 42/1, 
(2006), 69-83;  Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” p.17; and  Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and 
Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sage, 2009). 
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India’s objective is to become an indispensable element in the Asian balance of power.32   To 
the extent that such a statement suggests that India is likely to become an important 
element in an Asian balance of power, it is unexceptional.  However, to the extent that it 
implies that India has the option not to oppose Chinese hegemony over East Asia, it 
overstates India’s freedom of action.  It is difficult to realistically conceive of India not 
seeking to balance against China in Asia in one way or another.  Arguably, India is in fact 
compelled by its own great power aspirations to seek to form (limited) balancing 
relationships with the United States and its allies in relation to China.  
 
Spurred by dreams of strategic autonomy and a multipolar region, some Indian “hawks” 
have gone so far as to propose that India should develop an Indian-centred “constellation” 
of Asian states linked by cooperation and common interests, including in counterbalancing 
China.  Chellaney, for example, sees the India - Japan relationship as forming the potential 
foundation of overlapping security relationships in Asia. The relationship would provide 
India with a link into the US security sphere, forming the foundation of a coalition that 
includes the United States and Australia.  However, India would also develop a series of 
balancing relationships that go beyond the US security sphere, including, for example, an 
India-Japan-Russian trilateral relationship which, according to Chellaney, is the way to get a 
“true counterbalance to China” because it “would effectively contain China on all sides.”33  
India’s security relationship with Vietnam is also widely viewed in the Indian security 
community in approving terms, partly at least because Vietnam lies outside the US security 
sphere. 
 
Despite these dreams there is also a widespread understanding in the Indian security 
community that a strategic relationship with United States is a necessary or desirable 
feature of Indian security, if only as a step towards other strategic objectives.  Some believe 
that India’s challenge will be to form part of an informal balancing coalition against China 
with the US and its allies while avoiding becoming part of a US-led web of relationships.   
Bajpai, a leading neoliberal, characterises Indian policy since the end of the Cold War as 
32  C.Raja Mohan, “India, China and Asian Security,” The Hindu, January 27, 2003.   
33  Chellaney,  “Indo kara mita Nihon, Ajia.“    
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essentially bandwagoning with the United States, while also hedging in the sense of 
developing coalitions with first, second and third tier states that would assist it in standing 
up to the United States.34  Others see the possibility of India occupying a middle ground of 
partial attachment to the United States while retaining significant strategic autonomy.  
Mohan endorses the idea that India can navigate between the “two extremes” of an 
uncritical US alliance and what he calls the “slogans” of a multipolar world.   A somewhat 
ambiguous approach would likely fit well with India’s strategic tradition and domestic 
political imperatives.   Ambiguity could also be used to India’s advantage, for example, in 
allowing India to be cast within East Asia as a benign balancer not only against a potentially 
threatening China but also (if perhaps only symbolically) against potentially overwhelming 
US power.       
 
5. The ideological dimension: flirting with values-based alliances 
 
To what extent does India’s strategic behaviour in East Asia involve an ideological 
dimension? A notable feature of Nehruvian strategic doctrine was that India rarely allowed 
domestic political affairs of other states to be a significant factor in India’s foreign policy 
decision-making.   As a result of its colonial experience, India placed national sovereignty 
above liberal values.  To the extent that India’s foreign policy had an ideological dimension it 
often involved an alliance with communist or authoritarian states in opposing the supposed 
imperialism of the West.    However, in recent years Indian leaders have begun to make 
considerable use of the rhetoric of “shared democratic values” as justification for 
cooperation with Japan and other US allies in the region, to the exclusion of China.    Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh has called liberal democracy “the natural order of social and 
political organisation,”35 describing India and Japan, the largest and most developed 
34  Kanti Bajpai, “India: Modified Structuralism,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: 
Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 




                                                          
democracies in Asia, as being “natural partners.”36  Such statements are consistent with 
past efforts by the United States and Japan to use shared democratic values as an 
ideological foundation for strategic relationships with India.37     
 
Some Indian commentators have suggested that shared political values represent a “secret 
weapon” against China on the basis that China has much more to fear from the ideological 
subversion of democracy than in military terms,38 while others have invoked the theory of 
“Democratic Peace” to justify India forming alliances with other regional democracies.39   
The significance of alliances among democratic states is a matter of some theoretical 
debate.  It has little support from the so-called theory of “Democratic Peace” which 
proposes that democratic states never (or rarely) go to war with each other, but not the 
idea that democracies will or should become alliance partners against non-democracies.    
Some theorists nevertheless suggest that members of ideological-based alliances may have 
similarities in threat perceptions,40 and that alliances between democracies are both deeper 
and longer lasting than alliances with non-democracies.41  It has also been argued that as a 
great power matures, it will increasingly seek to shape its region and the international order 
in ways that reflect its values and identity.42   According to this argument, as a great power, 
36 Joint Statement of Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Abe, 16 December 2006. 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/12/15joint.pdf>. 
37 This represented a new approach for Japan, but clearly forms a key element in both neo-liberal 
and neo-conservative thinking in the United States.  See generally, G.John Ikenberry, Liberal order 
and imperial ambition: essays on American power and world politics  (Malden, MA : Polity, 2006). 
38 B.Raman, “India & Japan: Democracy as a Strategic Weapon” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 
206, 17 December 2006. 
39 Brahma Chellaney, “Towards Asian power equilibrium,” The Hindu, 1 November 2008. 
40  Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 266.   
41 Victor D. Cha, “The Ideational Dimension of America’s Alliances in Asia,” in Amitav Acharya and 
Evelyn Goh (eds.), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Competition, Congruence and 
Transformation (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 41-70. 
42 Ikenberry, Liberal order and imperial ambition. 
14 
 
                                                          
India might eventually seek to impose its own values on Asia despite its avowed policy of 
not exporting ideology. 
 
However, for the moment, ideology plays only a very minor part in India’s strategic 
engagement in East Asia, either as a motivation or as a tool of “soft power.”   Democratic 
values form part of a rhetorical package of shared interests between India and the United 
States and others such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, something which India has also 
found useful in differentiating itself from its two principal strategic adversaries, Pakistan and 
China.43  However there is little history of democratic values playing a significant role in East 
Asian strategic relationships and democratic values (or the lack of them) seem to have been 
little impediment to the development of India’s relationships with Singapore or Vietnam.  
India has also demonstrated a willingness to abandon democracy as a guiding principle 
where it believes that its interests are otherwise threatened (e.g. when support for Burma’s 
democratic opposition was reversed in the face of China’s increased influence with the 
Burmese junta).   As Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran commented, although 
“democracy remains India’s biding conviction, the importance of our neighbourhood 
requires that we remain engaged with whichever government is exercising authority in any 
country.”44    
 
6. India as a maritime power 
 
A new and potentially important element in Indian strategic thinking is a partial 
reorientation in India’s strategic outlook from purely continentalist towards a more 
maritimist perspective.  This helps fuel India’s ambition to become the predominant naval 
power in the Indian Ocean region, an ambition which has significant consequences on 
India’s security role in Southeast Asia.      
 
43 C.Raja Mohan, “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy Promotion,” The 
Washington Quarterly, 30/3 (Summer 2007), 99-115. 




                                                          
Indian security thinking has traditionally tended to take a “continental” outlook.   For 
thousands of years military threats to India have been perceived as coming primarily from 
India’s north-west.  This was reinforced by India’s experience in the twentieth century, 
when direct military threats to India were land-based: from the north-east (Japan, 1941-45), 
the north-west (Pakistan, 1947 and after) and the north (China, 1962 and after).  The 
continuing threats on India’s western and northern borders and from domestic insurgencies 
has led to the Indian Army holding an undisputedly dominant position within the Indian 
military establishment, in comparison to which the Indian Navy and its supporters have had 
little strategic influence.  
 
Despite this tradition there is a developing view among some Indian strategists of India as 
primarily a maritime and not a continental power.   According to some New Delhi is making 
a conscious effort to expand the Indian “mental map” in strategic affairs to include the 
seafaring dimension which can be compared with the fundamental shifts in strategic culture 
experienced by Japan and the United States in the nineteenth century.45  Many Indian naval 
leaders and commentators argue that India’s peninsular character and central position in 
the Indian Ocean gives the sea a preponderant influence over its destiny.  The former Indian 
Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar claimed that under the previous BJP government, 
“India’s national interest had been made coterminous with maritime security.”46   Other 
Indian leaders have drawn a close connection between India’s maritime ambitions and its 
destiny as a great power.  As Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee commented in June 
2007, “Fortunately, after nearly a millennia of inward and landward focus, we are once 
again turning our gaze outwards and seawards, which is the natural direction of view for a 
nation seeking to re-establish itself, not simply as a continental power, but even more so as 
a maritime power, and consequently as one that is of significance on the world stage 
45 James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st 
Century (London, Routledge, 2009), 33. 
46 Quoted in David Scott, “India’s “Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions,” Asia-
Pacific Review, 13/2 (2006),97-129 at 109. 
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(emphasis added).”47 Such thinking seems to echo the views of other great power aspirants 
such as the former Soviet Union and China that maritime power is a sine qua non of great 
power status.    Geography also suggests that any significant expansion of Indian influence 
can only take place in the maritime domain.  The Himalayas provide a formidable barrier to 
India’s ability to project power and influence northwards into continental Asia.    As Rajiv 
Sikri, a former Secretary in India’s Foreign Ministry commented: “If India aspires to be a 
great power, then the only direction in which India’s strategic influence can spread is across 
the seas.  In every other direction there are formidable constraints.” 48 
 
Many commentators have observed that geopolitical theories, particularly focusing on 
maritime power, have become prominent in strategic analysis in both India and China.49  
Mohan believes it a natural consequence of a shift of both China and India from inward 
leaning to outward leaning economies, commenting that:  “The sneering tone of the West 
vis a vis the Chinese and Indian fascination for geopolitics tells us more about the 
ethnocentrism in the West and its belief that the dominant view of the West today must 
necessarily be the prevailing fashion all across the world...”50   According to geopolitical 
analysis, maritime and continental strategic outlooks differ in fundamental respects.  A 
maritime strategic perspective focuses on the importance of securing sea lines of 
communication and key choke points joining bodies of water.  Geopolitical theory also often 
distinguishes between the characters of states within the “continental” and “maritime” 
realms.  The influential geopolitical theorist, Saul Cohen, divides the world into a “Maritime” 
realm (which includes Japan and other trade dependent East Asian states), a “Continental” 
47 Pranab Mukherjee, Speech for the Admiral A. K. Chatterjee Memorial Lecture, Kolkata, 30 June 
2007. 
48 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, 250. 
49 For example, Scott, “India’s “Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions,” at 109; and 
Banyan, “The notion that geography is power is making an unwelcome comeback in Asia” The 
Economist, 11 June 2009. 
50 C.Raja Mohan, “Maritime Power:  India and China turn to Mahan,” ISAS Working Paper  
No. 71, 7 July 2009, 9. 
17 
 
                                                          
realm (which includes Russia and, historically, China)51 and a mixed maritime/continental 
realm.   The difference is considered critical not only in terms of the manner of military 
power projection, but in general strategic outlook and underlying economic and political 
systems.  Maritime states are often characterized as liberal both economically and 
politically, in contrast to continental states that tend to be economically illiberal and 
authoritarian.   Thus maritime Britain is contrasted with (pre-war) continental Germany52 
and the maritime United States with continental Russia.53   
 
There is no clear consensus among geopolitical theorists as to where India fits in this 
picture, although some believe that India has the capacity to have either a continental or 
maritime focus.  Karnad, a leading Indian nuclear theorist and “realist”, argues that India has 
the flexibility to choose between a maritime or continental perspective and in doing so is 
able to tip the balance for or against the mainly maritimist United States in its contest with a 
continentalist China.54  Questions of maritime versus continental perspectives also underlie 
the debate as to whether the centre of gravity of India’s strategic orientation should lie 
towards West and Central Asia, a region which could be characterized as predominantly 
continentalist in outlook (with the exception of the small Gulf states) or towards East Asia 
which is arguably more maritime in nature.   
      
The most immediate impact of a reorientation in India’s strategic outlook is its strengthened 
focus on attaining naval predominance in the Indian Ocean region.  India’s standing as the 
most populous state in the Indian Ocean region and its central position in the northern 
Indian Ocean have long contributed to beliefs in New Delhi about India’s destiny to control 
its eponymous ocean.  Even before India’s independence, K.M. Panikkar, India’s most 
famous maritime strategist, argued that the Indian Ocean must remain “truly Indian” 
51 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
52 See, for example, H. van der Wusten; G. Dijkink, “German, British and French Geopolitics: The 
Enduring Differences,” Geopolitics, 7/ 3 (Winter 2002), 19 – 38. 
53 Colin S. Gray, The geopolitics of the nuclear era: heartland, rimlands, and the technological 
revolution (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977). 
54 Karnad, “India’s Future Plans and Defence Requirements,” 62-63 (note 98). 
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advocating the creation of a “steel ring” around India through the establishment of forward 
naval bases in Singapore, Mauritius, Yemen and Sri Lanka.55  According to some reports 
there is now a “well established tradition” among the Indian strategic community that the 
Indian Ocean is, or should be, “India’s Ocean.”56      
 
Many believe that the Indian Navy has come to see itself as destined to become the 
predominant maritime security provider in a region stretching from the Red Sea to 
Singapore and having a significant security role in areas beyond, including the South China 
Sea.    Others also believe that control of the Indian Ocean (including the chokepoints into 
the Pacific Ocean) could enhance India’s bargaining position with the whole of maritime 
Asia.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, the nineteenth century American naval strategist, is quoted 
widely and approvingly among Indian strategic thinkers including a statement attributed to 
Mahan that: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia….In the 21st century, the 
destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.” Although the attribution of the 
statement has been shown to be fictitious, it has not inhibited the enthusiasm for the ideas 
that it carries.57    
 
India’s ambitions for predominance in the Indian Ocean region underpin India’s security 
ambitions in maritime Southeast Asia.   Over the last two decades, the Indian Navy has 
played an active role in extending India’s influence throughout the Indian Ocean region and 
maritime Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.58  India has placed significant emphasis on 
achieving a predominant position in the Bay of Bengal and the western approaches to the 
Malacca Strait with the development of naval facilities in the Andaman Islands during the 
1990s. It has been suggested that for India, the Malacca Strait represents a rough 
55  K.M.Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power in Indian History 
(Bombay: George Allen & Unwin, 1971). 
56 Scott, “India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean,” at 99 
57 See generally, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power and India’s Security (London: Brassey’s, 1995), 
199. 
58 David Scott, “India’s Drive for a Blue Water Navy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 10/2 
(Winter 2007-08), 1-42. 
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counterpart to the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States in terms of 
maintaining regional hegemony.59 The Malacca Strait (which is largely within Indonesian and 
Malaysian territorial waters) lies on the major sea line of communication and represents the 
main choke point between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.  Indian control over the Strait and 
a security presence in Southeast Asia is seen by some as a prerequisite of effective control 
of the eastern Indian Ocean.  None of this is new.  In the 1940s, Panikkar recognized the 
particular importance of Singapore to India as the eastern anchor of India’s maritime 
security, predicting that India would be a principal security provider to Singapore.60   For 
some years, the Indian Navy has sought a direct security role inside the Strait, a significant 
factor underlying India’s strategic relationships with Indonesia,61 and wants to develop the 
capability to project naval power into the South China Sea, which is a significant factor in 
India’s security relationship with Vietnam.62   Mohan claims that as the Indian economy 
grows and it modernises its military capabilities it will become an attractive strategic partner 
in East Asia, generating strategic “options that did not exist before in the Western Pacific.”63    
 
There are, however, limits to India’s re-orientation towards a maritime perspective.   Some 
criticize the Indian Navy’s ambitions, claiming that India will always be a continental state.  
Sahni, for example, warns that the Soviet Union’s failed attempts to become a naval power 
in the 1970s and 1980s should act as “a cautionary tale for India’s Mahanian navalists…. a 
grim warning of what happens to a continental state that harbours overly grandiose 
maritime ambitions.”64  Sahni suggests that India should move away from following a “sea 
59 Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, 154. 
60 K.M. Panikkar, The Future of Southeast Asia: An Indian View, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1943), 100-1. 
61 David Brewster, “The evolving security relationship between India and Indonesia” Asian Survey, 
51/2 (March/April 2011), 221-244. 
62 Brewster, “India’s Strategic Partnership with Vietnam.” 
63 C.Raja Mohan, “Is India an East Asian Power? Explaining New Delhi’s Security Politics in the 
Western Pacific,” ISAS Working Paper No.81, 11 August 2009. 
64 Varun Sahni, “India’s Security Challenges out to 2000”  paper presented at the Australia-India 
Security Roundtable, Canberra, 11-12 April 2005.  Mahan also harboured significant doubts about 
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control” strategy based around expensive and vulnerable aircraft carriers and follow a “sea 
denial” strategy based on submarines.  Further, given India’s renowned lack of coordination 
in strategic planning, the Indian Navy’s activist role in the Indian Ocean region and 
Southeast Asia should not always be assumed as reflecting a unified position in the 
government or the armed services and there is long running tension between the Indian 
Navy and Ministry of External Affairs over the navy’s assertive regional policy, including its 
role in anti-piracy operations off Somalia.        
 
Despite these caveats, there are grounds to believe that a maritime perspective holds a 
significantly stronger place in Indian strategic thinking than in previous times.   
 
7. An Indian sphere of influence?  
 
Related to the increased prominence of maritime perspectives is a revival in thinking about 
an Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean region, potentially extending into 
Southeast Asia.   While such ideas can, in part, be viewed as a reaction to perceived 
incursions of China into India’s neighbourhood, they should be seen as primarily springing 
from India’s ambitions as a major regional power.   
 
Discussions of an Indian sphere of influence beyond South Asia are sometimes identified 
with Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India at the beginning of the twentieth century, who 
advocated that British India adopt a “Forward Policy” to secure India.  Curzon’s so-called 
“Forward School” argued that India’s security demanded control of the maritime routes and 
key ports en route to India (including Aden and Singapore) and the creation of territorial 
buffers to insulate direct contact with other empires (including Afghanistan in the west, 
Tibet in the north and Siam in the east) and for British India to take an active role in 
managing the affairs of the buffer zones.      
 
the ability of the United States to transform itself into a maritime power. See A.T.Mahan, The 
Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little Brown & Co) 83-88. 
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In many ways the policies of the British Raj represented a significant departure from Indian 
traditions, which had little history of territorial expansion or military or political adventure 
beyond the limits of the subcontinent.   Many characterise Indian strategic behaviour as 
defensive or reactive. According, to K. Subrahmanyam, called the “doyen” of Indian 
strategists by the current Prime Minister, “The essential Indian weakness, which our 
adversaries are well aware of, is the total lack of a tradition of strategic thinking and our 
reactive style of decision making in every sphere.”65 Tanham’s study of India’s strategic 
culture in the early 1990s characterised Indian strategic thinking as being “defensive” and 
having a “lack of an expansionist military tradition.”66   Certainly, any affirmation of an 
Indian security sphere beyond South Asia largely ceased following independence.  After 
1947, India effectively withdrew to the Indian subcontinent and asserted what has been 
called “India’s Monroe Doctrine” according to which India would not permit any 
intervention by any “external” power in South Asia and related islands.  While India had only 
limited success in this policy, India’s Monroe Doctrine was used to justify interventions in 
India’s smaller neighbours such as Sri Lanka and Maldives.67   An exception to this limited 
area of influence was Indochina, where during the Cold War India developed a strong 
political relationship with Vietnam in an effort to limit the influence of China and other 
“external” powers in that subregion.   Indian leaders and strategists claimed that Vietnam 
guarded the eastern flank of India’s “core sphere of influence” in South Asia.68    
  
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a revival in discussion in India about a 
“natural” sphere of influence extending well beyond the Indian subcontinent.   This is 
65 K. Subrahmanyam, “Slumber over National Security” Economic Times (New Delhi), 31 October 
2000. 
66 George Tanham, “Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay,” in George K. Tanham, Kanti P. 
Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds), Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice in an Emerging 
Power, (New Delhi: Manhora, 1996), 73.  
67 James R.Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “India’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and Asia’s Maritime Future,” 
Strategic Analysis, 32/6 (November 2008), 997- 1011. 
68 According to Indira Gandhi.  See John W.Garver, “Chinese-Indian Rivalry in Indochina,” Asian 
Survey, 27/11 (Nov. 1987), 1205-1219 at 1207-8. 
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related to attempts to move beyond India’s strategic preoccupations in South Asia and re-
engage with its extended neighbourhood so as to rectify what Foreign Minister Jaswant 
Singh called India’s unnecessary acceptance of “the post-Partition limits geography imposed 
on policy.”69  In 2001, the Ministry of Defence Annual Report described what it called India’s 
security environment as extending from the Persian Gulf in the west, to the Straits of 
Malacca in the east,70 an area which the former BJP Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh called 
India’s sphere of influence71 and the current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has perhaps 
more diplomatically called India’s strategic footprint.72   Some have tried to re-articulate the 
geographical idea of “South Asia” (in which India is naturally predominant) towards a 
concept of “Southern Asia”, a region extending from the Persian Gulf to Singapore (in which 
India will grow to dominate). Subrahmanyam proclaimed that it is India’s “manifest destiny 
to control Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean sea-lanes around us.”73 (emphasis added)  His 
words were no doubt intended to evoke claims by the United States to a special role in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
 
Mohan has labelled India’s reach into its extended neighbourhood over the last decade or 
more as a neo-Curzonian “Forward Policy,” claiming:   
 
“The end of the cold war and the efforts to globalise the economy put India willy-nilly 
on the path of a new forward policy.  India never consciously articulated its approach 
in terms of theory that demanded activism in the neighbouring regions to enhance its 
own security.  Its regional initiatives were presented in terms of mutual economic 
benefit and the restoration of historic links, but their strategic significance was 
unmistakable.”74 
 
69 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 205. 
70 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2000-2001.  
71 Chidanand Rajghatta, “Singhing Bush’s Praise,”Times of India, 13 April 2001. 
72 “PM’s Address at the Combined Commander’s Conference,” 24 October 2004. 
73 Quoted in Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, 38. 
74  Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 209. 
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Suggestions that India is pursuing (or should pursue) a new Forward Policy have been 
strongly criticised by some Indian strategists seeing it as an inappropriate, irrelevant or 
“quixotic” attempt to return to imperial thinking.  Despite such criticism, it is not difficult to 
view India’s strategic engagement with East Asia, and particularly with Southeast Asia, as 
having elements of a reassertion of British India’s sphere of influence centred on the Indian 
Ocean and extending from Aden to Singapore.  In the east one might see Indian hopes to 
develop Burma as a buffer state against China, while India gains maritime predominance in 
the Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea and a major role in the Malacca Strait.  Singapore would act 
as the eastern “anchor” to this space. In the west India exerts influence in Afghanistan while 
it renews its historical relationships with the Gulf States and Iran.75      
 
While there are indications of India’s ambitions to build something that might be called a 
“sphere of influence” there is little guidance as to what it might look like, particularly in 
Southeast Asia. Certainly, India’s approach to building a sphere of influence from Aden to 
Singapore differs significantly from Lord Curzon’s.   India has no choice but to accept that it 
must develop its influence in a non-confrontational way.   As Foreign Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee commented (in relation to South Asia):  “India does not seek an exclusive sphere 
of influence, but a shared sphere of mutual development and cooperation.”76  Similarly, 
Mohan argues that New Delhi is unlikely to make an attempt to regain the hegemonic role 
of British India in the Indian Ocean region.77  India’s cooperative approach to developing 
security relationships has been evident in Southeast Asia, where the Indian navy has been 
successful in developing good relationships in the region and has displayed sensitivity 
towards local political concerns in relation to the Malacca Strait.     
 
The failure of India to project military power beyond the limits of South Asia during the Cold 
War has placed India in good stead in East Asia.  India has a noticeable lack of historical 
baggage in its dealings in the region, perhaps with the exception of the Islamic factor arising 
75 For a discussion of India’s security relationships throughout the Indian Ocean, see David Brewster 
“An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?” Security Challenges , 6/3 (Spring 2010),  1-20.   
76 Amit Baruah, “Not seeking exclusive sphere of influence,” The Hindu, 11 February 2007. 
77 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon,ch.8. 
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from India’s conflict with Pakistan.  India is commonly perceived in Southeast Asia as 
essentially a benign power and not a would-be hegemon, often in contrast with other 
powers such as China, the United States and Japan.  According to some, India’s track record 
of nonaggression, its cultural and philosophical virtues, and its ethnic and religious ties to 
Southeast Asia lend credence to Indian soft power diplomacy.78  While India is not in a 
position to exert significant power through military predominance or ideological means, it 
may be able to do so as a provider of public goods.79   In the early 1990s, Tanham described 
India’s regional ambitions in the following terms: 
  
“Strategically, India aspires to be a friendly international peacekeeper.  It sees itself 
as a benevolent nation and a friendly policeman that seeks peace and stability for the 
entire Indian Ocean region.  It denies any hegemonistic designs or territorial 
ambitions.  It vehemently rejects and resents charges of being a regional bully.  It 
wants not only to play the role of regional peace-keeper but also to be acknowledged 
and endorsed in that role by others, especially the great powers.”80 
 
India shows a strong desire to expand its presence in the region as a benign and cooperative 
maritime security provider.  Over the last decade it has proffered its capabilities in disaster 
relief (such as during the 2004 Tsunami) and in maritime policing in the Andaman Sea 
(including in dealing with piracy, smuggling and arms trafficking).   Since the mid-1990s, the 
Indian Navy has hosted the biennial MILAN naval “meeting” of regional navies in the 
Andaman Islands. In 2008 the Indian Navy sponsored the establishment of the Indian Ocean 
Naval Symposium, a biennial meeting of naval chiefs from all Indian Ocean states modelled 
on the US-sponsored Western Pacific Naval Symposium.  These are often portrayed as 
successful examples of cooperative naval diplomacy by the Indian Navy and may help 
mitigate concerns about India’s intentions.  However, at the same time, India has been 
78 Holmes et al, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century,155. 
79 For a discussion of these different ways of exerting hegemony, see Rajagopalan, “India and the 
Great Powers”. 
80 Tanham, “Indian Strategic Thought,” 69. 
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careful to exclude both the United States and China from such gatherings, thereby 
emphasising India’s leading role. 
 
Nevertheless, as it expands its influence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, India has 
had to accept that other major powers will continue to have significant interests in the 
region.   The United States, particularly with its base at Diego Garcia and its naval facilities in 
Singapore and the Gulf, seems likely to remain the predominant naval power in the Indian 
Ocean region for some time to come.  However, there are indications that the United States 
is willing to cede – and indeed encourage – a major regional naval role for India across the 
Indian Ocean, including in or around the Malacca Strait.  For its part, India’s willingness to 
cooperate with the United States in achieving its ambitions is not as paradoxical as it may 
seem.  As the former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, once conceded, the United 
States in developing its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth 
century relied on the then superpower Britain (then in relative decline), to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine until the United States was sufficiently strong to do so itself.81   
 
Is the revival in Indian strategic thinking about a sphere of influence merely a defensive 
reaction to perceived intrusions of China into India’s strategic space or is it derived from 
India’s ambitions as a great power?  Neorealists argue that it is natural for especially 
powerful states to seek regional hegemony.  They may explain the development of a sphere 
of interest in terms of small states electing to bandwagon with a larger power instead of 
balancing against it.82  From a geopolitical perspective, spheres of influence are seen as a 
normal part of ordering the international system.   According to Cohen: “… spheres of 
influence are essential to the preservation of national and regional expression….the 
alternative is either a monolithic world system or utter chaos.”83  The expression of a sphere 
of influence over the Indian Ocean region up to Singapore and beyond might be seen as 
India reasserting an historical or geographical role that was interrupted by India’s post-
81 Dean G. Acheson, A Democrat Looks at his Party (New York: Harper, 1955), 64. 
82 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 23-4. 
83 Saul Cohen, Geography and politics in a world divided (2d ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1973), viii.   
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independence self-limitations, limitations which India is now consciously seeking to 
overcome.     
 
However, China also provides good defensive reasons for the development of a sphere of 
influence.  Many Indian strategists see China’s actions in Southern Asia, including its 
consolidation of Tibet, its alliance with Pakistan and its relationships with Burma, 
Bangladesh and Nepal as part of a cohesive and successful policy of “encirclement” or 
“containment” of India.  The expansion of China’s relationships and interests across the 
Indian Ocean - its so-called String of Pearls strategy - is viewed by many among the Indian 
security community as primarily motivated by a strategy of maritime encirclement of 
India.84   The development of a “defensive” sphere of influence is thus justified by China’s 
actions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.  As the former Indian Chief of Naval Staff, 
Admiral Arun Prakash, commented: “The appropriate counter to China’s encirclement of 
India is to build our own relations, particularly in our neighbourhood, on the basis of our 
national interests and magnanimity towards smaller neighbours….”85     
 
Some “hawks” claim China’s putative encirclement strategy justifies a more offensive 
approach by India, advocating a policy of “counter-encirclement” of China, including the 
development of security relationships along China’s periphery in Southeast and Northeast 
Asia and North and Central Asia.86  The development by India of security-related facilities in 
84 For examples of Indian claims about China’s String of Pearls strategy, see Ramtanu Maitra, “India 
bids to rule the waves,” Asia Times, 19 October 2005; Sudha Ramachandran, “China moves into 
India's back yard,” Asia Times, 13 March 2007; and Brahma Chellaney, “Assessing India’s Reactions 
to China’s “Peaceful Development” Doctrine,”  NBR Analysis, 18/5 (April 2008).   
85 Admiral Arun Prakash, “China and the Indian Ocean Region” Indian Defence Review, 2/4 (October 
– December 2006), 7-12 at 11. 
86 See, for example, Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, “Countering China’s Strategic Encirclement of India,” 
Indian Defence Review, 15/3 (July-September 2000), 17;  Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and 
Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi : Macmillan India, 2005);  Mohan Malik, 
“Sino-Indian Relations in the 21st Century:  The Continuing Rivalry,” in Brahma Chellaney (ed.), 
Securing India’s Future in the New Millenium (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 1999); and 
27 
 
                                                          
Tajikistan and Mongolia are taken as evidence of India’s counter-encirclement strategy in 
Central and North Asia and such a strategy might be seen as driving India’s relationships 
with Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan on China’s eastern periphery.  A counter-
encirclement strategy is also used to advocate the development of a direct India security 
presence on China’s periphery, including Indian control of the Malacca Strait and ultimately 
an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea and even possibly in the Sea of Japan.87   
 
Many Indian strategists would strongly reject any proposition that India is involved in any 
counter-encirclement strategy against China.   Some are beginning to advocate co-operative 
ways of addressing the apparent Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean.  India’s 
National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, recently unofficially proposed the discussion 
of collective maritime security arrangements among all the major powers concerned in the 
Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific (i.e. including the United States and China) in order to 
minimise the risk of interstate conflict and threats from piracy and terrorism.88  Clearly, such 
an arrangement might be a useful way of mitigating the maritime security dilemma in the 
Indian Ocean.  Arguably, it might also institutionalise a leading maritime security role for 
India in the Indian Ocean and a security role for India in Southeast Asia and the Western 
Pacific.   The development of a working concert of major powers with a limited focus on 
maritime security would also have obvious implications for the broader Asian security order 
consistent with India’s overall objective of developing a multipolar order.   
 
Conclusion   
 
India has not articulated any “grand strategy” about East Asia and seems unlikely to do so 
any time soon.   As a result, Indian strategic thinking about East Asia is best understood as a 
Iskander Rehman, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s Counter-Containment of China in Asia,” Asian 
Security, 5/2 (May 2009), 114-143.  
87  Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p.541 and Mohan Malik, “China’s Strategy of 
Containing India” Public Interest News Report, 6 February 2009. <www.pinr.com>. 
88 Shiv Shankar Menon, “Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy,” speech to the National 
Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, 11 September, 2009.  
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mosaic of perspectives and pragmatic goals which often cross ideological boundaries.   It is, 
however, possible to identify two key factors that are driving Indian strategic thinking about 
East Asia:  rivalry with China (which is essentially a reactive dynamic) and India’s ambitions 
to achieve great power status (essentially an active dynamic).   
 
Fears of possible Chinese hegemony in East Asia and of Chinese “intrusions” into India’s 
strategic space in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region have led to greater prominence in 
realist thinking about balancing China.  From India’s perspective this is a significant factor in 
its relationship with the United States and Japan and smaller states such as Singapore and 
Vietnam (although such motivations may not necessarily be reciprocated in Southeast Asia).  
However, India’s ability to enter into any balancing coalition with the United States and its 
allies is limited by its objectives of maintaining strategic autonomy and avoiding overt rivalry 
with China.    
 
Beliefs about India’s destiny as a great power underlie a separate stream of strategic 
thinking, one more rooted in geopolitical perspectives.   India’s strategic outlook is 
increasingly oriented towards a maritime perspective, driving its aspirations to become the 
predominant naval power in the Indian Ocean.   Related to these ambitions are ideas about 
the development of an Indian sphere of influence which, among other things, would 
encompass the littoral states in the northeast Indian Ocean.  As a result, India is increasingly 
projecting naval power into Southeast Asia, although it has been careful to do so in a 
cooperative manner.  The challenge for India in coming years will be how to expand its 
influence in East Asia in a way that is seen as constructive for regional security. 
 
Note on Contributor 
 
Dr David Brewster is a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University.   He has written widely on Indian strategic affairs and is the author of 





 “PM’s Address at the Combined Commander’s Conference,” 24 October 2004. 
<http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=432>. 
 
Acheson, Dean G., A Democrat Looks at his Party (New York: Harper, 1955). 
 
Ayoob,  Mohammed, India and Southeast Asia : Indian perceptions and policies (New York: 
Routledge, 1990). 
 
Bajpai, Kanti, “India: Modified Structuralism,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
 
Bajpai, Kanti, “Indian Strategic Culture” in Michael R. Chambers, South Asia in 2020:  Future 
Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). 
 
Banyan, “The notion that geography is power is making an unwelcome comeback in Asia” 
The Economist, 11 June 2009. 
 
Baruah, Amit ,“Not seeking exclusive sphere of influence,” The Hindu, 11 February 2007. 
 
Batabyal, Anindya, “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s Look East 
Strategy,” China Report (New Delhi), 42/2 (2006), 79-197. 
 
Brewster, David, “The strategic relationship between India and Vietnam:  The search for a 
diamond on the South China Sea?” Asian Security, 5/1  (January 2009), 24 – 44. 
 
Brewster, David “An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?” Security Challenges ,  
6/3 (Spring 2010), 1-20.   
 
Brewster, David “The India – Japan Security Declaration:  an enduring security partnership?” 
Asian Security, 6/2 (2010), 1-27. 
30 
 
 Brewster, David, “The evolving security relationship between India and Indonesia” Asian 
Survey, 51/2 (March/April 2011), 221-244. 
 
Brewster, David, India as an Asia Pacific Power (London: Routledge, 2011). 
 
Cha, Victor D., “The Ideational Dimension of America’s Alliances in Asia,” in Amitav Acharya 
and Evelyn Goh (eds.), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Competition, 
Congruence and Transformation (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 41-70. 
 
Chaudhuri, Rudra, “Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 32/6 (December 2009), 841-869. 
 
Chellaney, Brahma and Horimoto Takenori, ““Indo kara mita Nihon, Ajia“ [Japan-India Links 
Critical for Asia-Pacific Security] Gaiko Forum, 7/2 (Fall 2007). 
 
Chellaney, Brahma, “Assessing India’s Reactions to China’s “Peaceful Development” 
Doctrine,” NBR Analysis, 18/5 (April 2008).   
 
Chellaney, Brahma, “Towards Asian power equilibrium,” The Hindu, 1 November 2008. 
 
Cohen, Saul, Geography and politics in a world divided (2d ed.) (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1973).   
 
Cohen, Saul Bernard, Geopolitics of the World System (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
 
Devare, Sudhir, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006). 
 
Frankel, Francine R. and Harry Harding (eds.), The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and 
Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
31 
 
 Ganguly, Sumit, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (eds), US-Indian strategic cooperation into 
the 21st century: more than words (London: Routledge, 2006). 
 
Garver, John W., “Chinese-Indian Rivalry in Indochina,” Asian Survey, 27/11 (Nov. 1987), 
1205-1219. 
 
Gopalan, Sita, India and Non-Alignment (New Delhi: Spick & Span, 1984). 
 
Gray, Colin S., The geopolitics of the nuclear era: heartland, rimlands, and the technological 
revolution (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977). 
 
Gupta, Amit, “US-India-China: Assessing Tripolarity,” China Report (New Delhi), 42/1, (2006),  
69-83. 
 
Holmes, James R., Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st 
Century (London, Routledge, 2009). 
 
Holmes, James R.and Toshi Yoshihara, “India’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and Asia’s Maritime 
Future,” Strategic Analysis, 32/6 (November 2008), 997- 1011. 
 
Ikenberry, G.John, Liberal order and imperial ambition: essays on American power and world 
politics  (Malden, MA : Polity, 2006). 
 
Jain, Purnendra, “From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan’s Changing View of 
India (1998-2007)”, Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper No.41, 10 March 2008. 
 
Jaipal, Rikhi, Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace (New Delhi: 




Joint Statement of Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Abe, 16 December 2006. 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/12/15joint.pdf>. 
 
Kanwal, Colonel Gurmeet, “Countering China’s Strategic Encirclement of India,” Indian 
Defence Review, 15/3 (July-September 2000), 17.   
 
Karnad, Bharat, “India’s Future Plans and Defence Requirements” in N.Sisodia and C.Udaya 
Bhaskar (eds), Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives (New Delhi: Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2005), 61-76. 
 
Karnad, Bharat, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy 
(Delhi : Macmillan India, 2005). 
 
Latif, Asad-Ul Iqbal, Between Rising Powers: China, Singapore and India, (Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 2006). 
 
Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little Brown & Co). 
 
Maitra, Ramtanu, “India bids to rule the waves,” Asia Times, 19 October 2005.  
 
Malik, Mohan, “Sino-Indian Relations in the 21st Century:  The Continuing Rivalry,” in 
Brahma Chellaney (ed.), Securing India’s Future in the New Millenium (New Delhi: Centre for 
Policy Research, 1999).  
 
Malik, Mohan, “China’s Strategy of Containing India” Public Interest News Report, 6 
February 2009. <www.pinr.com>. 
 
Menon, Shiv Shankar, “Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy,” speech to the 
National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, 11 September, 2009.  
 
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2000-2001.  
33 
 
 Mohan, C.Raja, “The Asian balance of power” Seminar, 487 (2000). 
 
Mohan, C.Raja, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs, 85/4 (July/August 2006), 
17. 
 
Mohan, C.Raja, “India, China and Asian Security,” The Hindu, January 27, 2003.   
 
Mohan, C.Raja, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
 
Mohan, C.Raja, “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy 
Promotion,” The Washington Quarterly, 30/3 (Summer 2007), 99-115. 
 
Mohan, C.Raja, “India’s Changing Strategic Profile in East and Southeast Asia,” paper 
presented at the Regional Outlook Forum, Singapore, 8 January 2008. 
 
Mohan, C.Raja, “Is India an East Asian Power? Explaining New Delhi’s Security Politics in the 
Western Pacific,” ISAS Working Paper No.81, 11 August 2009. 
 
Mohan, C.Raja, “Maritime Power:  India and China turn to Mahan,” ISAS Working Paper  
No. 71, 7 July 2009, 9. 
 
Mohan, C.Raja, “The Evolution of Sino-Indian Relations: Implications for the United States,” 
in Alyssa Ayres and C.Raja Mohan, Power Realignments in Asia:  China, India and the United 
States, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2009), 270-290. 
 
Mukherjee, Pranab, Address to the 7th Asian Security Conference, 29 January 2005. 
 




 Mukherjee, Pranab, Speech for the Admiral A. K. Chatterjee Memorial Lecture, Kolkata, 30 
June 2007. 
 
Panikkar, K.M. ,The Future of Southeast Asia: An Indian View, (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1943). 
 
Panikkar, K.M., India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power in Indian 
History (Bombay: George Allen & Unwin, 1971). 
 
Prakash, Admiral Arun, “China and the Indian Ocean Region” Indian Defence Review, 21/4 
(October – December 2006), 7-12. 
 
Rajagopalan, Rajesh and Varun Sahni, “India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, 
Normative Necessities,” South Asian Survey, 15/5 (2008), 5-32. 
 
Rajan, Mannaraswamighala Sreeranga, Studies on nonalignment and the nonaligned 
movement: theory and practice (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1986). 
 
Rajghatta, Chidanand, “Singhing Bush’s Praise,”Times of India, 13 April 2001. 
 
Ramachandran, Sudha, “China moves into India's back yard,” Asia Times, 13 March 2007.  
 
Raman, B., “India & Japan: Democracy as a Strategic Weapon” South Asia Analysis Group, 
Paper No. 206, 17 December 2006. 
 
Rehman, Iskander, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s Counter-Containment of China in 
Asia,” Asian Security, 5/2 (May 2009), 114-143.  
 




Sagar, Rahul, “State of mind: what kind of power will India become,” International Affairs, 
85/4 (2009), 801-816. 
 
Sahni, Varun, “India and the Asian Security Architecture,” Current History, Vol.105 (690) 
(April 2006), 163-7. 
 
Sahni, Varun, “India’s Security Challenges out to 2000”  paper presented at the Australia-
India Security Roundtable, Canberra, 11-12 April 2005.   
 
Saran, Shyam, “India and its Neighbours”, address in New Delhi, 14 February 2005.  
<www.meaindia.nic.in>. 
 
Scott, David, “India’s “Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions,” Asia-Pacific 
Review, 13/2 (2006), 97-129. 
 
Scott, David, “India’s Drive for a Blue Water Navy,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 
10/2 (Winter 2007-08), 1-42. 
 
Sikri, Rajiv, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sage, 
2009). 
 
Singh, Manmohan, “PM’s Speech at India Today Conclave” 25 February 2005, New Delhi. 
<www.pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=510>. 
 
Singh, Manmohan, “Address at the 16th Asian Corporate Conference,” Mumbai, 18 March 
2006. 
 
Sisodia, N.S.and Sreeradha Datta, Changing Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia (New Delhi: 




Sridharan, Kripa, The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing, 1996). 
 
Subrahmanyam, K., Indian security perspectives (New Delhi: ABC, 1982). 
 
Subrahmanyam, K., “Slumber over National Security” Economic Times (New Delhi), 31 
October 2000. 
 
Tanham, George, “Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay,” in George K. Tanham, 
Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds), Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice in 
an Emerging Power, (New Delhi: Manhora, 1996), 73.  
 
Tellis, Ashley J., “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia” in Zalmay 
Khalilzad et al, The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture 
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), 214. 
 
Tellis, Ashley, India as a New Global Power:  An Action Agenda for the United States 
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 2005).  
 
Tellis, Ashley J., “India in Asian Geopolitics” in Prakash Nanda (ed.), Rising India: Friends and 
Foes, (New Delhi: Lancer, 2007), 129. 
 
van der Wusten H. and G. Dijkink, “German, British and French Geopolitics: The Enduring 
Differences,” Geopolitics, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 (Winter 2002), 19 – 38. 
 
Varadarajan, Siddharth, “Bush, India and two degrees of separation,” The Hindu, 3 March 
2006 
 
Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).  
37 
 
